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1. AMENDING PROCESS JAPANESE COMPANY LAW IN 1951 
The Company Law of Ja:pan were changed.seriously by the law 
No. 167， 1949，“The La w Amending a Part. of Commercial La w ぺ
Present Company Law of Japan have been developed under 
the influence of the Contineutal Law， inwhich German Law was 
most powerfu1. It can be said that German legal .'theories have 
co批rollednot only the fundamental principles of the Japanese 
Company Law hut also the interpertation of the speci五carticles. 
Especially in case of the extreme consistency of legal organizat-
ion theory and emphasis of the supreme authotity of a shareholders' 
general meeting， the theoty had. easi1y lapsed into an abstract 
organization theory which ov:errid tb.e interest of each shareholder 
and had a tendency of aggravating totalitarianism. 
Anglo-American Company Law denies such an extreme organi-
zation theory when de五ningconstitution of a company as trust 
relation. This fact is antiposal to the continental1aw， and especially 
to the German Law. 
Since Japan's， surrendel'， a large number of laws have been 
enactedas . mentioned previously.. It is significant to point out 
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that company law was legislated under the in自uenceof the Anglo. 
American， mostly under the influence of the American Law. 
It was great advantage to t与eJapanese for the economic 
recovery to adopt the system of the company whichis a typical 
form of enterprises in America， because Japan wouldhave to depend 
of America's aid thereafter. These economic factors which gave 
strong influence over the revisions of the Japanese Company Law 
were incontestable. 
However， we， as researchers of laws， take great interests in 
the fact that the company in Japan would be managed under the 
principle of equity by introducing trust idea in the sustem of the 
company. 
Now 1 wi1l explain the process of the amendment of the 
Japanese Company Law in 1951. According to the Japanese 
Company Law， payment in instal1ment in case of buying stocks was 
prohibited in July， 1948， by the Jaw， No. 148， 1948 and only ful 
payment method was avai1able. Under this full payment system， 
however， when a company needed its own fund after establishment 
of the company， there was no other way for them to issue new 
shares. Because ot these facts the company should have an 
extraordinary resolution of shareholders' general meeting for which 
they would face great. di伍culties.
Japanese governrnent thought it necessary to adopt the au-
thorized capital system， setting up a group Qf Preparatory Research 
Committee for the amendment of Comercial Law. Simultaneously， 
the government began to study non:par stock system n()w e百ected
in America， in order to aquire funds more easierly. Thus， in1949， 
relevant dra;ft of law concerning authorized capital and non-par 
stock were developed. 
Being advised by the authority concerned， the government would 
haγe to amend the commercial "la w along the line of strengt~ening 
of shareholders' right， 'strengthenirtg of transferabi1ity of stocks， 
seeting a value on a shareholder's' voting right and pre-emptive. 
i'i主ht，and recognizing the right of. inspecting books and records. 
. Subsequently， the :Preparatory Research Committee for Amend. 
ment of Commercial Law had heated consultations .in the matter 
and produced afinal draft for the amendment in AUgust， 1949. 
The government announced the draft public1y on August 13，' 1949 
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as a “Bi1 for Amendment of a. part of the. Commercial La w ぺ
According to the preamble， the draft view pC1ints are as 
fol1ows: 
To adopt authorized capital system 
To recognize issuance of non-par stqck 
To protect shareholder's dght to inspect the books' and 
records 
To a缶rmtransferbi1iiy of stocks 
To gurantee pr・e-emptiveright of new stocks 
To respect voting right of a shareholder 
To clearify resposibi1ty of a director 
To protectright of minority shareholders 
To amendpresent regulations concerning foreign companies. 
The government trasferred this draft to the Legislation Council 
to be reviewed. After much deliberation of artic1e by artic1e， the 
Commercial Law' Commitee of this Council added new articles， 
involvirig curtai1ment of the power of a shareholdets' general 
meetiug， adoption of system of Board of Directors， abolition of 
joint stock company with limited partnership (Kabushiki.goshi-
gaisha) and the articles ammounting 71 in tota1. 
Following to this draft made by the Commercial Law Commitee、
of the Legislation Counci1， the government drafted a revised bi1 
for the amendment of the Commercial Law and produced it before 
the seventhdiet in February， 1950. 
The bi1 was passed with s1ight revision ofthe House of 
Repl'esentative and the House of Counci1ors respectively on May 2， 
1950. This bi1 was promu1gafed as the law No. 167， 1950; on May 
10 of the same year it was put into e妊ectfrom July 1， 1951. 
I. PRINCIPAL POINTS OF AMENDMENT & REASONS OF AMENDMENT 
Now， 1 will introduce established thoeries about the principal 
points of the amendment and reasons of the amendment. 
The principal points .of. the amendement al'e divided into three 
basic parts by leading professors in la w : 
1. To sb'engthen faci1tation of procurement of company's 
fund by adopting the authorized capital system and non-par value 
share system， 
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2- To amend managing system 'of 'company such as establish-
ing of a board of directors and strengthening of this board and 
consequent reduction of the power of a sharehold.ers' general 
assembly and the power of auditor， 
3. To strengthen sha1'eholde1's' position， that is a缶1'mationof 
sha1'eholde1's' to' apply for 'injunction against illegal actions of 
qirectors， right of rep1'esentative suit， 1'ight of inspection of books 
and 1'ecords and right ofa shareholder's who is opposite to a 
resolution of amalgamation and transfe1'ring of the enterpr・iseto 
the c1aim for the purchase hisjher shares， at the same time， to 
faci1itate transferrableness of stocks， to mitigate capacity of 
minority shareholders and to confi1'm liberty and1'espectfulness of 
a sha1'eholdet's position， by making conditions of shareholders' 
geneI・aImeeting more rigid， and ultimately to strengthening of a 
shareholder's position. . 
Hereafter， 1 wilI explain the principaI part of the amending 
Iaw 'comparIng the present Iaw with the old law， artic1e by artic1e 
acco1'ding to the estab1ished theories of Japan. 
a) Adoption of authoirIied capital system andnon-par value 
sha1'e system 
ACCOI・dingto the old company Iaw of Japan， itwas indispens-
. able to make‘up a memorandum of the association when a person 
was estab1ishing a company; and description of amount of capital 
was absolutely.needed to be written in the memo1'andum. (3 & 4， 
Pa1'agraph 1， Artic1e 7. the former law) 
Joint and stock company shall not be established 1.mtil pay-
ments fo1' the capital are fully paid withcomplete endorsement 
fo1' the whole share equivalent to the amount of capital by promoters 
01' the generaI public and 0缶cialregistration of the establishment 
finish. (Article 57 & 188， the Old Law) 
In the amended law which adopted the authol'包edcapital 
system，“Total m1mber of sha1'es to be lssued by the company ヘ
“Total Numbe1' of' shares， c1assification of par value 01' non-par 
value and its number on estab1ishmeritof the company"， "Sum 
of a share' in' case of issue of par .value share" and "The 
lowest price of a share in' case of issue' of non-par value share" 
shall be c1arified as the absolutely necessa1'y artic1es instead of the 
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articles of “The amount of Capital" and “The Face Value of a 
Share" of the former law. (3，6，.4，7; Para. 1， Art 167， the present law) 
And also inc1uded，“The total number of shares issued by the 
company on itsestablishment shall not. be less than one fourth 
of the whole nt!mber of shares to be ist!ed by them." (Para. 2， 
Art.167， the present law) However， the article read，“To establish 
company legally， itshall be necessary for the whole numbe1' of 
shares-to be issued upon establishment of the company to .be sub-
scribed completely by promoters 01' the generalpublicand to be 
fully paid sti1l remains in the present law. (Art. 57 & 188， the 
present la w) 
By these amendments， the total number of share to be issued 
when establishing a company shal1 be limited to one fourth of 
shares issued by tbem totally and remaining three-fourth of shares 
may be issued freely and dividedly by a 1'esolution of the board 
of directo1's. (Para. 2， Art. 280， the present law) 
In case whe1'e they need their own fund afie1' establishment 
Qf the company， itis left in case of compalli's free wil1 whether 
they issue par-value or non pa1'-value share. The chice shaH be 
made according to a provision written in a memorandum of the 
Association. In case where there is no provision in the memoran-
dum， the choice shall be made by consent of af al the promote1's 
as long as the shates isstled on establishment of the company (par. 
2 Art. 28， the presei1t law). and about the shares issud after 
establishment of company， the selection of issue shal1 be made by 
the boa1'd of directors. (Pa1'a. 2， Art. 280， the p1'esent law) 
As 1 stated before， de白litionof the “capital" was remarkably 
changed compared to its de五nitionwritten in the former law due 
to the amendment done to the a1'tic1es concerning the capital. 
By the old la w， the amocnt of capital was c1riri五edby the 
memorandum of the association and amount of -capital would be 
purely same as the total face value of the whole shares. But by 
the revised law， the amount of capital shal1 not be decided by the 
momorendumρf the association， because， the company shall c1a1'ify 
only the limit of totaln umber of shares in its memorandum of 
the association and in case of the fol1owing issue， within the 
limit， the boa1'd of directors. may decide freely. Fol1owing to the 
adoption of non par-yalue share system，“ shares~' is not necessa1'i1y 
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correlated to “capital " from the theoretical point of view. Even 
in s.uch a case， itgaes without saying that actual value of non 
par-value shares issued ti1 then constitutes the capital. (Para. 
2， 2 Art. 284， New Law) Therefore， as to non par-value share， 
whole actual value on issue does not necessari1y coincide with th'e 
capital and U shares" wi1 resultantly not have connection with the 
"?apital"， because the amending law provides that the amount not 
exceeding one-fourth of total amount of shares issued may not be 
assigned to capital (Pa. 2， 2ar 284)・ Allin all， the old theory， 
which was based strictly on the organisati:on theory， ise功 ressed
briefiy by the paragraph，“company is an organization of the 
capita1." and this theory was iric1ined to collapse gradually. 
b) Establishment of a Board of Directors， Strengthening of 
its Power and subsequent Reduction of the .power of a 
Shareholders' General meeting. 
By the former company law， incase where there is several 
dir:ectors . ina company， right of representing the company shal1 
be executed by each director respectively unless a memorendum of 
the 'association or a resolution of a shareholders general meeting 
indicate another way; in another word each director' has the 
complete right of representing the company. (Paragraph 1 &. 2， 
Artic1e 261， 01d Law) 
And management of the' company shall be executed by a majority 
resolution of directorsunless a memorandum of. the association 
prohibit or indicate other wise (Article 260， 01d Law) 
By the amended law， management of the company shall be e玄ecuted
by board of directors which comprises of al directors. (Artic1e 
260， New Law) 
a Representative of a company shall be a representative director 
who is decided by. aresolution of the board of directors. (Artic1e 
261， New Law) 
The idea of this board of directors as a representative council 
wi1 necessari1y be followed by the following fact: 
Intentions of the board of. directors shall be expreased by a 
formal meeting of the board of directors to which a majority of 
directors are requested to attend. (Para. 2， 2 Artic1e 260， New 
Law) 
Often the discussions by the board of directors， a record of 
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debates， inwhich process and paints of the debates are requested 
.to be inscribed with the signatures of. attending directos. (Para. 3， 
Art. 260， the present law.) Therefore， directors who acted as 
independent organ of a company by the old law， lost their raison 
detre as tl1e organ of the company and became only a member of 
the bo~rd of firectors by the new la w. 
The fact that a director shall be elected by the. shareholders' 
general meeting and relation between a dir・ecto・'rand company 
shall be in conformity with regulation of mandate remains uncha-
nged under the in宜.uenceof new law. (Para. 1 & 2， Art. 254， 
Old Law; Para. 1 & 3， Art. 254， the present law) Under the new 
law， conditions of being a director and relation between a company 
and their directos are sti1 unchanged， but as to power of a 
director， he may execute his Tighむonlyas a member of the board 
of directors: 
Though having no direct cannection with the board of directors. 
there is an important new artic1e about the position. of a director 
as follow$: As to duty of loya1ty of directors， the new articIe 
states;“Directors shall be under obligation to observe laws and 
artic1es of a m'emorandum of the association and to perform their 
. duties faithful1y on behalf of their company." ( 2 Art. 254， the 
present la w) This artic1e gives a director poistion of trustee 
and c1arifies the same spirit as duty of loyaItyof trustee. Members 
of legal society in Japan cannot fully understand this significant 
meaning and Seem to regard this duty of loyalty as the same as 
duty of due care of mandator. As to this point 1 wi1l e功 lain
later. 
As the amended law adopted system of the board of directors， 
this Anglo・Americanlegal. theory. in which contains the principle， 
“Directors shall execute the management of a company as a group 
of directors" was poured into Japan. And the next important 
point is strengthening of the power of the board of directors. 
Unti1 then， in Japan， a shareholders' general meeting' of 
comprehensive power ordered and controlled over al other orgaIls 
of a company with its absolute authority over the management of 
the company being the highest orgaIi of the company a$ it were 
the diet of democratic country and directors should perform their 
activities in accordance with a decision of shareholders' general 
meeting. 
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ー Onthe contrary， by the new' law， a shareholders' general 
meeting may make up a resolution in limited matters de白ledby 
this law and a memorandum of theassociation; and authority of 
the shareholders' general meetirtg is 1irnited to the definite matters 
decided by law an迂amemorartdum of the association. 
On the other hand， matters exc1usivel)7 bβlonging to the power 
of the board of directors was decided by the law. Consequently， 
theboard of directors is not an organ of a. company which is 
completely inferior to a shareholders' general meeting; but the 
board of directors is a co-existent organ with a shareholders' 
general meeting. 
As 1 states befolfe， even by the new law， a director shal1 be 
elected by shareholders' general meeting and. the maintenance of 
his position wi1 entirely depend upon the wi1 of shareholders' 
general meeting. But a direむtorafter elected， may exc1usively 
execute the authority subject to the board of directors as a member 
of the board. One of the largest powe1' of the boa1'd of directors 
are the right of decision of issue' of new shares (2， Art. 280， New 
Law) based on the authorized capital system and the 1'ight of 
decision of issue debentu1'es. (Art. 290， New Law) 
Howeve1'， the shareholders' gene1'almeeting stil1 has the autho-
rity ove1' the following matters: 
Change of a merrio1'andum of the association 
(Artic1e 42， New Law) 
Dissolution (No. '2， Artic1e 404， New Law) 
Atnalgamation (Art. 408， New Law) 
Transferring of whole 01' a prt of ente1'prise， 
or lease of whole enterprise. (Article 245， New Law) 
Judging. from this fact， the authority of shareholder's general 
meeting can sti1l stand comparison with the autho1'ity defined in 
the old law. But it goes without saying that the ai.rlhority of 
sh~reholders' general meeting was reduced with the advance of 
the power 01 the board of directors. 
c) Strengthening of the shareholder's position. 
New artic1es of the amended law on the shareholders'position 
are divided into two kinds. One . is an amendment on the right of 
managing a company deriving it from shareholder's position; and 
the other is new formulation of artic1es which was added to prevent 
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a company from infringing the right of shareholders. 
As to the rights of managing acompany are follows: 
1. To make conditions of a shareholders' general meeting 
rriore strict. 
Under the former law， method of resolution 0ぱfshareholde訂r♂，
gene町ral、 meetingis divided into two kinds， omethod of ordinary 
roesolutions and method of extraordinary resQlutions. 
In case of ordinary resoluticins， a resolution shall be made by 
a majority voting right of shareholders who would attend the 
assembly. (Paragraph 1， Artic1e 239， 01d Law) 
In case of extraordinary resolutions， such cases as change of 
a memorandum of the association and other certain important 
matters， a resolution shall be made bya majority votes of attending 
shareholders who shares value exceeds a half of amount of capital; 
in this case attending shareholders shall be the majority of share. 
holders. (Article 343， 01d Law) and a shareholders shall have 
only one voting right for one share. But the voting rights of 
shareholder who has more than eleven sb'ares shall be 1imited to 
a certain degree and a shareholder whose name has been regi-
stered within six months before the day of meeting shall have 
no voting right (Para. 1， Article 241， 01d Law). 
Under the present law， methods of resolution of shareholder's 
general assembly are also divided into two kinds: namely method 
of ordinary resolutions and method of extraordinary resolutions. 
But in case of ordinary resolution， a resolution shall principally 
be made by a majority voting right of attending share holders 
whose shares exceed a half of a1 shares issued til1 then， i.e. a 
quorum is necessary in the ordinary ‘resolution. (Paragraph 1， 
Artic1e 239， New) 
As to this artic1e， however， a company may make contrary 
provision by writing its e旺ectin a memorandum of the association. 
Therefore， a company may decide that， a quorum shall not be nec 
essary in case of ordinary resolution. 
As to extraordinary resolutions， under the present law， a 
resolu:tion shall be made by two-thirds majority votes of attending 
shareholders whose shares exceed a half of the whole shares issued 
QY that time. (Artide 343， New Law) Being different from the 
ordinary resolution， itis significant that the methbd of extra-
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ordinary resolution， 1.nder， the present .law， shal1勾otbe changed 
even by an indication writh;n in a memorandum of the association. 
Connecting with the strict condition of resolt:rtion， 1'1 now 
state on the s1.bject on numbers of a shareholder~s vo.ting right. 
Under the former law， principlly that of a shareholder voting 
rights， althogh the principle (jf one vote for one share was recogni-
zed， a company may place a restraint On voting rights of a share-
holder whose share exceeded eleven shares and may regard 
shareholders as having no vot.ing right jf they have not elapsed six 
months since the registration oftheir names on the 1ist of share-
holders. (Paragraph 1， Artie1e 241， The Old Law) 
The Present la w denies the restraint on a shareholder's voting 
rights and made the principle，“A shareholder sha11 have one 
voting right for one share hejshe has "， be absolute. (Paragraph 1， 
Artic1e 241， New Law) 
As 1 have explained so far; amendments done upon the former 
law， such as making conditions of resolution strict， con五rmingthat 
a shareholder sha11 have one voting right for one share， and etc.， 
aim at the extreme respect of shareolders' voting right. This 
eventually aims at the strengthening of a sh前eholder'sposition 
m a company. 
2. Mitigation of minority shareholders' capacity 
Under a theory of j1.ridical person， principle of majority deci. 
sion is prepondent. Bu:t 1.nder the company law， for the p1.tpose 
of preventing a violation of a majority decision， minority share-
holders' right of request of calling .shareholders' general meeting 
is recognized exceptional1y regardless of majority shareh~lders' 
wi1. This is so ca11ed the right of minority shareholders. Under 
the former la w， shareholders whose shares exceeded one tenth of 
the capital was able to exercise the right of minority of. share~ 
holders. (Artic1e 237， the old law) 
The present law， mitigating a capacity of minority sharehold. 
ers; the shareholder who have continuo1.s1y had three hundredth 
of shares issued mOre than six. months， may be cal1ed minority 
shareholders. (Artic1e 237， New Law) Anyhow， mitigation of this 
kind means strengthening of a. shareholder's position 
In order to relief a shareholder's righi. of infringement by a 
TRUST CHARACTER OF COMPANY LAW (AMENDMENT) OF JAPAN 27 
company， the following rights are recognized: 
3. Right of giviving an injunction to il1egal matters by a 
director. 
“In case where a director acts an ultra vires act or any 
other act against the Ia w and the memorand江戸1of the association 
and wil1 probably cause unrecoverable" damage to" a company， the 
sharehoIders who have continuously had" their号hares""more than 
six months may on behalf of the company request the director to 
forbid to act (Artic1e 272， New Law) 
The artic1e of this present law designs strengthening of a 
shareholder乍 position，by adopting an injunction system of Anglo-
American La w. 
This artic1e was newly employed by the present Iaw. The 
article of the former law， in order to protect the minority share-
holders against the infringements by the director， gives them the 
right of request to. suspend the director's illegal actions and eIect 
a proxy at a court after convoking shareholders' general meeting 
which aims at the dismissal of the director based on right of 
minority shareholders." (Artic1e 272， 01d Law; also in New Law， 
Artic1e 270)， but it does not give direct: right 。ぱfp炉1
director's act. 
The present law permits sharehoIders who have continuously 
had their shares more than six rnonths to appeal directly to a 
court. This fact shows a profound understanding on strengthening 
of a shareholder's position. 
4. Representative Suit. 
By the present law，“A shareholder who has continuously 
had shares more than six months may request a company in 
written document to commence legal proceedings to call director's 
account. (Paragraph 1， Artic1e 267， New Law.) 
In case when a company" does not bike Iegal proceedings 
within thirty days after accepting the request of the shareholder， 
the shareholder may take necessary legal proceedings for the sake 
of the company. (Paragraph 2， Artic1e 267， New Law) 
By old law，if the resolution is not adopted in shareholders. 
general meeting， minority shareholders who have continuously had 
their shares which are more than one tenth of the capital and 
more than three months can make request to the company to take 
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legal proceedings against a director. .(Artic1e 268， 01d Law) 
However， a shareholder can not take fl1rther procedures to 
rescue the rights under the former la w. 
By the present law，. every shareholder shall have the right 
of request to a company to take legal proceedings against a 
director， and if the company does notagree with the request the 
shareho1ders may appeal directly to a court. 
This system was made after the pattern of the representative 
strit of America. 
This idea of representative suit of America was based l1pon 
a thought that a shareholder has an equitable estate in the 
property of company. 
In Japan， the idea of this kind is not yet recognized. But this 
new artic1e isa strengthenihg testimony of a shareholder's position. 
5. Right to inspect books and records. 
As to right to inspect books and records of a company under 
the former 1aw， itwas limited to inspect an inventory of the 
company's property， a.balance sheet， a report on business and a 
prO五tand 10ss report. (Artic1e 281， Old Law) 
But these books and record ShOW8 only an outline of an 
enterprise. 
A shareholder who was given the right to call a director's 
account and also was given the right of request to forestall the 
director's illegal actions. And the shareholder whose power being 
strengthened to a great extent， should necessari1y have right of 
knowing financial condition of the company more precisely. To 
thisend， the present law. gives the right to inspect books and 
records to the shareholder. .The artic1e is read as follow.: “A 
shareholder whose shares exceed one tenth of who1e shares of a 
company may request the company to inspect and take a copy of 
the books and records of the. company." (Para. .1， 6 Artic1e 293， 
New Law)“The request mentioned in the. preceeding paragraph 
shal1 be produced in a written document." (Para. 2， 6 Artic1e 293， 
New Law) 
For the purpose ofpreventing an abuse of the l'ight by those 
who are going to USU1'p a company， a company may refuse the 
request in. accordance with a certain condition，. that is，“In case 
TRUST CHARACTER OF COMPANY LAW (AMENDMENT) OF JAPAN 29 
whe1'e a company 1'ecieve a 1'equest in acco1'dance. with the pro-
ceeding a1'ic1e， a directo1' shal1 not 1'efuse the 1'equest except in 
a case whe1'e the1'e a1'e 1'easonable 1'easons to be 1'ega1'ded as 
applicable to the following pa1'ag1'aphs : 
a) In case where a shareholder request to inspect noi for the 
purpose of confi.rming and exercising hisjhe1' right but‘in order to 
disturb management .of a company 01' injure shareholders' common 
Interests. 
b) In case whe1'e the 1'equested shareholder is car1'ying on the 
same business as the company， 01' is an employee， a sぬha幻主
a di1'ecto1' of a company which is ca町工1'ryingon the same busi-
ness as the company or a person who has s也ha町1'e白sfo1' the s岱ak恥e 
Oぱfanother company who has the same business. 
， c) .In case whel'e a shareholde1' request to inspect for the 
pu1'pose of informing others of results of inspection and taking a 
.copy ofbooks .and records with profi.t， or in case where a share. 
holder is a person who has informed others of l'esult of inspection 
and taking . copy of books and records with pro五twithin two yeal's 
before the date of the l'equesL 
d) In case whel'・ea shareholder request in inadequate time 
to a company to inspect and take a copy of books & records. 
Reasons why the 1'ight to inspect books and records has been 
1'ecognized in Anglo-American. Law a1'e based on a theory that a 
sha1'eholder has right to・inspectbooks and reco1'ds of a company 
freely as hisjher own， due to the fact that property of the company 
belong to a shareholder in ‘equiiy." (7 a1't~ 293) 
Like this， this 1'ight does not only mean the strengthening of 
a shareholder's position 01' convinience of knowing fi.nancial con-
dition of the company but also involves the new theory mentioned 
as above. 
In Japan; adoption of this right is 1'egarded in general as 
strengthening of a sha1'eholder's 1'ight. But my further explanation 
in this matte1' should .be done. 
6. The right of ashal'eholdel' .to claim for purchase of hisj 
her shares 
As 1.0 transferring. .of a whole enierpriseof a company 01' an 
important part of the ente1'prise of the company， leasing of a 
whole enterpl'台e，assignment of whole enterprise，∞ntract entering 
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into complete partnership with others， changing and cancellation 
ofa contl'act being applicable to thesecontracts， inheritance of 
a whole enferprise .of other company and other actions in general， 
causing a substantial change of the company's property， the present 
law， as well as the former law， regulated . these acti.on shal1 be 
decided by. .extraordinary resolutions of shareholders' general 
meeting. (Artic1e 245， New Law; Artic1e 245， 01d Law) 
Though such a strict extraordinary reso1uiion is needed， this 
resolution is to be decided by a majority.Consequently，.protection 
、ofa minority shal'eholders was not attained properly. Therefore， 
the present 1a w gives a shareholder the right of objection in wriiten 
at the shareholders' general meetng， where a resolution is to be 
adopted， and a shareholder who opposed to the resolution in the 
meeting， may request a c1aim for the purchase of hisjher shares 
after the resolution was 'adopted by fair price which isequivalent 
to the same price when the 'resolutions were not adopted. (Para-
graph 2， Artic1e 242， New Law)、
However， incase where a resolution of dissolution of a company 
is made， this right to c1aim for the purchase' of shares shall. be 
extinct. (Proviso， 2， Art. 245， New Law) Because， after a resolution 
of dissol ution is made， the company wi1 necessarily enter in 
winding up proceedings and the shareholder can be distributed 
a part of the remaining property of the company in this winding 
up proceedings. This right isalso applied to a case of amalgamat-
ion， (2 Art. 608， New Law) This right to c1aim for the purchase 
of hisjher shares is not recognized at a1 under the forrner law. 
According to a princip1e of decision of the majority， even a 
shareho1der who is oppositeto this resolutions sha11 have to 
submit to hisdisadvantage caused by the resolutions. In America 
this right :).0 c1aim for the purchase of a shareholder's share， who 
opposete to a resolution has been provided by law from the early 
times. And this idea is' based upon a theory that a shareholder has 
the proper ，right in equity for property of a company and sub-
sequent1y this right shall not be infringed by a simpledecision 
of the majority. 
However， Japanese legaL researchers do not haveany further 
notion of kind but explain str~ngthening a shareholder's position. 
Members :of the academic society of law jn Japan explain the 
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amending points of the company law， 1951 as three c1assi五.ed
points. And they a1so have 'some exp1aintions for the amendments 
from the fol1owing inspective point of view : 
1. Expediency of procurement of fund of a company. 
2. Strengthening of .power of a director in management of a 
company 
3. Strengthending of a shareholder's position. 
They are not going to. investigate the relation‘s between these 
three amendments. or are not. going to make a further research in 
studying of theoritica1 background of these a'mendments， un1ess 
substantile di百erencebetween a continental company law with an 
organization 1ega1 theory and the Anglo・Americanlaw without the 
organization legal theory is comp1etely c1arified. The enlighten. 
ment for the true object of the Amendments in Japan and resultant 
application of .the amended law wi1 not be expected. 
Jatanese academic society .was ャnotperfectly quiet in this 
matter. Some scholars indica，ted that the di旺erencewas based on 
more toward the contract theory than on the organization theory. 
And under the infiuence of Anglo.American Law， definition of the 
word“Cornpany" waseventually separated from theconstitutes 
of the company， the Anglo・ArnericanCornpany 1a w lays ernphasis 
on the idea that' a cornpany is a resu1t of a collective contract 
made by an individual who is a mernber of the cornpany. 
But the contract theory .of this kind， they won't be able to 
explain anything about the problem， because， ifa company were 
a collective contract of rnernbers， itis' possible to p1ace strict 
restriction on the right Of each mernber .ot a cornpany or if 
necessary， ispossible to place further extrem restrictions on it for 
the sake the entire mernbers of the company. Moreover， itis 
possible to restrain power from the director. 
The whole contract theory is too obscure to explain the 
particu1ar points of the arnendments， .therefore， we must search 
for another leading prjnciple which wi1 clarify the amending points 
accurately and synthetically in other theoritical五eld.
II. TRUST CHARACTER OF. COMPANY LAW 
A. . Preface 
In my opinion，. we are confident that we cannot fullyunder-
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stand the object of these amendments of the company 1a w of 1951 
in Japan except regarding these amendments formulated uton the 
trust theory. 
IdeR of this “trust" has been developed in. England and re-
markably progressed inAmerica，. and it can be said to understand 
the Anglo-American La w completely we must針stfirst to under-
stand the idea of the “trtロ1stγ"
In五gurati討velyc∞omparing， i託fthe comrnon law were the skelton 
Oぱfthe Anglo-Ame町ricanLaw， law of. equity whch broughtup the 
idea of trust would be b100d or musc1e. Simi1ar to the fact that 
a man can fully excercise his whole strength with full circu1ation 
of his blood， la w of equity can give vivid e豆ectto the common 
la w to the fullest extent. The idea of “trust" is very fami1iar 
to the Birtish and Americans. 
At the end of Meiji era， this trust legal theory was introduced 
to Japanas a form of Law of Trustfor Mortgaged Bonds. There-
fore， the idea of“trust" was. thrusted a way as one item of a 
special law and could not occupy"an important role in the Japanese 
legal system. At the end of Taisho Eta， the Trust Law under the 
infl.uence of Ang10・AmericanLaw wasenacted in order to supervise 
general trust busirtess. For this. reason， this 1aw did not attract 
Iluch attention of acader'nic circ1e but was st江diedonly by. the 
researchers of the Anglo-American Law and business men. 
Despite" the fact; the idea of “trust" "existed in the legal 
system， Japanese "academic circ1e of law regrettably did not pay 
any attention to it. At the "same time di百erencebetween the idea 
“trust"" and “五duciarishesrechtsgeschaft" of German Law was 
not" enlightened. 
" Since Japan's surrender， almbst a1 of the Japanese laws have 
been successively changed accOrding to a character of Anglo-
American La w: When the word，“trust "a ppear・edin the preamble 
of the :new Consitution， itattracted keen attention of" Japanese 
academic circ1e. Even under such circumstances Japanese academic 
circ1e， controlled， and、infl.uencedbythe German Law， cannot fully 
understand the particular points of the Anglo-American Law. We 
cannot blame their lack of knowledge on the idea of . trust ぺ
It is nutural that they cannot reeognize the Anglo-American 
Company" La w deve10ped upon a .profound basis of trust character 
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and put into effect， and is also not too strange that the Japanese 
academic circ1e regarded the amendments as one kind of appear-
ance of a cont1'act theo1'Y and did not bothe1' on fu1'the1' 1'esea1'ch. 
Howeve1'，託goeswithout mentiQningwe must unde1'stand wel1 
the .t1'ust character of the Anglo・Ame1'icanLa w since the funamental 
p1'inciples of Anglo・Ame1'icanLa w was once tised fo1' the amending 
of the Japanese Company Law. He1'eafter， 1 wi1. explain the 
trust cha1'acte1' of the Anglo-Ame1'ican Company Law and 1'easons 
why we can synthetical1y unde1'stand the amendiig points of Japa-
nese Company La w only through full understanding of this trust 
cha1'acter. 
R Specific Character Theory on an A1'ti五.cialPerson in 
England and Trust Cha1'acter of Anglo-American Co. La w. 
A theory of an artificial person has been developed In England 
to make position of the existing king 01' Bishop as eternal 
existence， separating it from the individuality of King or a Bishop ; 
this development was not originated f1'om an idea of gemeinschaft 
in the Continental La w. According to the idea of gemeinschaft 
in. the Continental Law， a large number of pe1'sons constitute a 
sp~cific organization and at the same time， a common object and 
a definite o1'ganization are to be indispensable elements. But in 
the British Law， these elements are not needed to separate the 
specific positions as eternal ones f1'om an individual who occipies 
the positions. In this case， only an ideation that can formulate 
an idea of recognizing an eternate existance， apart from an 
individual as a human being， isrequested. As for an idea of an 
a1'ti五cialperson in BritishLaw， an element of an organization 
where a col1ective contract of a large number of individuals is 
notnecessari1y indispensable and idea of a corporation sole in 
which an individual can constitute legally an artificial person， is
recognized. 
On the other hand， they also recognize an idea of corporation 
aggregate in which a large number . ofindividuals constitute a 
specific organization， gatherIIig for a commoi1 object. Thus the 
B1'itish recognized there were two kinds of a1'ti五cialpersons. This 
fact su缶cientlyshows a substance of a theory of an arti包cial
pe1'son in England. Of course， numbers of corporation sole are 
less than ones of corporation aggragate，' but the fact that they 
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recognize the existence of a corporation sole shows c1ear1y. that 
the theory of an' arti五cialperson stands on a particular thoughts 
which differ entirely from theone in the Continental Law. 
From this particular character of theory of anartificial person 
in England， there could not be any thebry of existentialism of an 
arti包cialperson or sharpening of an incorporation and organization 
th~ory. 
In the modern age， corporation aggregate has occupied almost 
all of the arti包cialperson and ili special， existence of a company 
has been recognized as an unit of commercial activities.: Even iri 
this case， they regard that foundation of existence of the corpora~ 
tion aggregate is a contract of individuals who constitute the 
corporatio:ri aggregate. 
αcOUrse， even in England， the corporation aggregate proper 
has an independent existence， apart from individuals who constitute 
the corporation， and it acts in.accordance'with a resolution made 
by an individual who constitutes the corporation which has the 
~haracter of eternity and . immortality.、 TheBritish thinks the 
corporation aggregate may sue or be sued in its own nameand 
may have its own property and right at the .same time. . The 
di百erencebetween “company and a partnership" exists in this 
point according to thi;nking of the British. 
But this fact is recognized as a convenient way only to attain 
a specific purpose， .the British wil1 not discuss on the existen匂 of
abi1ty of i1egal activities of anarfificial person， being di在ererit
from the Continental La w， but wi1 regard these illegal actiVites 
as the ones made ty indhriduals who constitute the artifici~l person， 
regardless the . existence of the .~rti五cial person. And they also 
regard estab1ishment of.corporation aggregate as one kind of simple 
contract. But， the Conginental， Law regard the estab1ishment of 
the corporation' as a “Gesamtakt". namely opinions of ma，ny 
individuals concentrated on the common purpose. 
But this legal theory. of England， as to the case of establish-
ment of a company， invested property is regarded as the property 
transferred to the company based on an ic1ea of trust and a director 
should act. for the sake of a .shareholdel' as a l'epl'esentatIve of 
the company. Accol'・dingto the British a shar・eholderought to 
have the' right in ‘equity on the propertyof a company. In other 
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word， under the Continental Law， an idea of establishment of 
company was developed from a contract viewpoint to an idea of 
coI1ective activities; and the idea of a company which is an extreme 
abstract existence apart from an actual organization and also 
apart from individuals wbo constitute tbe company was expanded 
by the idea of tbe Continental Law. 
In England， however， substance of an organization of a com-
pany has been studied by a theory of trust relation， respecting 
the character of an individual who constitutes the company. A 
theory on an arti五cialperson in England is entirely di旺erentfrom 
an organization theory of the Continental Law. Therefore， the 
essential part of the Anglo-American La w cannot be understood 
unless we understand trust relation. 
Indeed， as 1 stated before， as to the case of the corporation 
aggregate， itis an independent character apart from an individual 
who constitutes and o1'ganization. As long as this point concerned， 
there is no difference between the idea of an arti五cialperson in 
the Continental Law and the one in the Anglo-American Law. 
But， we can easily find that many fundamental principles of the 
Anglo-American La w stand on the basis of trust 1'elations. 1 wil1 
verify this fact in the following paragraphs. 
a) Authorized capital system in England and America 
According to this system， establishment of a company shall 
be finished afte1' formation of a memo1'andum of the ass∞iation， 
and subsc1'iption and payment fo1' a ce1'tain number ofshare with-
out fu11 subscription and payment fo1' the wholeshares of the 
company. And the fund of the company wi1 gradually be increased 
by future payments of sha1'es which wi1l be issued adequately by 
a directo1' within limitation of specific number of sha1'es decribed 
in a memorandum of the association. If a company should decide 
a amount of capItal as a company material as the Continental 
La w indicates， this so1't of system can be most dangerous. 
Because， ifwe place a stress on the independente characte1' 
and an idea of organisation of a company， itwi1 give too much 
important authority to a directo1' who is just an executive or只an
of a company. In this case， by the thinking of the Continental 
La w， these decision to be made by a directo1' ought to be done by 
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a resolutiou of a shareholders' assembly and in the long run of 
the authorized system should be denied. 
However， we can easily explain the authbrized capital system 
if we江氏 thetheory of trust relation. ; According to this theory，. 
is natural for a director to hold property of a company in trust 
provided by a company and shareholders and wi1 manage the 
cqmpany by hisjher own judgement. But even in Anglo-American 
Company Law， however， property of a company belongs to a 
company without any connection with a director and is not a 
director's own ，property. 
Under the Anglo-American Law， an idea of independent 
character of a compa.ny is formal1y recognized but as to actual 
management of the company， a dir・ectoracts as a substantial 
trustee. Judging from this fact， a director is regarded as a real 
trustee of the trust by the Anglo-American Law. Scholars of 
England and America often explain the theory tha t property of 
the company held in a director's hand and must be understood 
from the trust viewpoint by such a五gurativethinking. However， 
though this thinking is figurative， the British legal theory is 
entirely different from the theory legal of the continental la w 
in which a director is regarded as only an executive organ 
of the company. Because the legal theory of the Continental 
La w has depeloped along the line of sharpening abstractness of 
independent character of a Company. 
Moreoγer， by the la w of juridical precedent in England and 
American， in case where a director・issued against hisjher misap-
propriation of a company'sproperty， 'the British often used an 
expression of “breach of trust" and applied not only the theory 
of reparation for injury caused by negligence of duty but also 
applied the constructive trust theory which regarded restoration 
of the property and possession of the compensa tion as property of 
trust. This theory of coi1structive trust should be applicable to 
the trustees who violated trust business. 
In England and America， especially in America， w here the 
theory of business trust is being actually prevailed， itis more 
appropriate inactual cases to explain ol'ganisation of a company 
by the theory in which organisation of the company is regarded 
as one of trust relations between directors and trusters who are 
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members of the company. 
This. kind of autborized capital system in Englanc1 and America 
.are tbeoritically inconsisient with theory of the Continental Law， 
which places stress to the utmost on an independent character of 
a companyby developing an incorporation theory as One of organi-
zation theories. 
b) Position of a Director and a Board of pirectots under the 
Anglo・AnmericanLaw. 
This also can be explained by the theory of trust. It is admi-
tted opinion for theories of juridicaI precedent and academic 
theories to explain a director's position by a theory of trust in 
which a director shall be trustee of trust And this director's 
position of trustee of trust is not only explained in relation 
to a company but also in relation to a shareholder. 
To be true to the fundamenal principle as a trustee of trust 
for ihe company， a director should act purely for the benefit of 
the company and at the same time， should strict1y be requested 
not to gain hisjher own pro五ts. According to these fundamental 
principles， severe restrictions shall be placed on a transaction 
between a director and a company to which a di1'ecto1' belongs 
and the t1'ansaction between ihe two parties may be avoided 
at al1 times by the company and it is strictly p1'ohibited fo1' a 
directo1' to bor1'owmoney from the company; and properiy acquired 
by a djrector， avai1ing hisjher .position shall耐lallyb.elong to the 
company. These legal theories depend upon the same spirit of a 
theo1'Y of t1'ust which prohibited trustee's acquisition of 1'ight on 
the trust prope1'ty anp regarded property acquired by the tl'・ustee，
avai1ing trustee's position， as t1'ust p1'ope1'ty. 
Between dir・ecto1' and shareholder， a di1'ector shall be liable 
to all of sha1'eholders to protect the intercst of shareholders 
equally. The1'efore， the di1'ecio1' should not look to hisjher own 
interests or to interests of speci五cshareholders. 
In case where， a director injure a shareholder's bene批 01'look 
to hisjhe1' own interests， a director should compensate the whole 
damage done for the benefit of all sha1'eholde1's 01' should have 
p1'ofits acquired through such prohibited activities belonged to al1 
shareholders. 
A directorも positionas a trustee. of trust was explained 
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already. FUr・thermore，a system of a board of directors clearly 
shows particular character of trust theory. 
Under this system of a board of directors， power of manage-
ment of a company belongs to a board of directors as a represent-
ative counci1 and not belong to a respective director. Thisム isa 
marked character of this system. The director can act legally 
e丘eptivelyfor the company only in a dul1y called meeting. 
Thus， this system doesn't give executive right of business to 
a respective director but give it to a board of directors as a 
representative counciL 
This is a presentation of the trust theory that in case where 
there are several trustees， disposing trust business， all trustees 
shall have to perform the business， cooperating each other and 
trust property shall be joint情ownershipof all trustees. 
Furthermore， the principle of a board of directors as a 
represetative counci1 may permit that a respective director may 
perform business of a company without holding the meeting if all 
shareholders agree. 
This fact is also as the same as the trust theory that as to 
execution of trust business， ifall trustees agree， all trustees shall 
be able to act respectively. 
c) Trust Character of Legal Theory of Anglo-American Law 
on shareholders' position. 
Anglo・Americanlegal theory on “shareholder's position" shows 
more c1early the tr・ustcharacter of a company. Properly speaking， 
it is natural for a respective shareholder's position tohave the 
tendency of weakening gradually with the advance of a theory of 
incorporation. 
Of course， even under the Continental Law， there was regula-
tions which protected rights of a minority shareholders for the 
purpose of restraining a majority from violent decision by a 
majority. This right is provided in the Continental Law for the 
purpose of preventing “unavoidable evi1" in the incorporation 
theory and notproper1y aims at protection of right of minority 
shareholders itself. 
‘But right of a shareholder. in Anglo・AmericanLa w. is based 
on the fol'owing thoughts， namely， though a shareholder leav'e 
contribution to a company in trust with a director the shareholder 
has right in equity on property of t1;le company and in case where 
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rea1 damage or po'ssible damage is done to property of the company， 
namely trust property， the shareholders mayrequest a relief based 
on the right in e仁luity.
As r stated befor丸 inAnglo-American Law， too， the property 
of a company is a separate and independent arti:ficial person's 
property and is dealt separately from right of the shareholders. 
But， there were severa1 cases judged that a shareholderhad 
proper equitable estate on property of a company. Moreover， there 
was a following judgement if a director would once act il1egal1y 
to accomp1ish his/her fraudulent purposes under the cloak of 
independent character of the company， the theory on independence 
of a company would not be applied immediately and a shareholder乍
right on. property of the company would be appeared. 
As to a shareholderセ position，Anglo-American Company Law 
is based Upon the fact that a shareholder 1eft management of a 
company to the wil1 of the director within their ordinary authorities， 
but， in an emergency， a shareholder who has an equitable right 
on porperty of the company， may exercise remedial right in equity. 
.Cases fo1' I‘emedial right are not a few. Fo1' example， in case 
where a directo1' act against his/he1' duty， resultantly causing 
damage to property of a company and the company does not take 
a legal proceedings against the directo1' to call his/her account， 
a shareholde1' may sue at court i1'ectly against the director. 
This is so called representative suit. 
The reason why this remedial 1'ight is 1'ecognized is that though 
a property of a company belongs to the company， a shareholder has 
quitabl right on the property. This thought is entirely same as 
trust law indicate in case where trust property is infringed by 
the third party， and a truste of trust does not take legal proceedings 
against the third party direct1y. Taking another example， incase 
where such resolutions as amalgamation of company， transferring 
of the whole enterprise， changing of an object of an enterprise， 
which wi1 cause an important change to a company， are adopted， 
a shareholde1' who is opposite to the resolutions may exercise 
right to c1aim fo1' purchase of his/her shares， and another example 
. isthe 1'ight to inspect records and documents of a company. 
These are also an apperrance of the legal" theory of this kind. 
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The reason why this right is given as an indeprievable right of 
a shareholder is completely due to a theory of trust that share-
holder is a real owner of property of a company and a director 
holds the prope此yin trust as a trustee. Records and documents 
of the company shal1 not be possesed privately and exclusively by 
the director and the reports of trust business done by the director 
as the trustee of the shareholder; and consequently the share-
holder， may inspect freely these records and documents. This fact 
is an expression of trust theory， too. And the followings facts 
are also presentations of this legal theory: the fact that share-
holder may obtainan injunction to restrain director of the company 
from commiting breach of duties and act i1egal1y Gr unfairly， the 
fact that a， shareholder be given remedial right in equity as an 
independent party of a contract with a company. 
And the most important fact is .the one concerning right of 
subscription for new shares. As a director is ~ trustee of trust， the 
director is requested not to act against benefit of the shareholder 
and the shareholder shal1 have equitable right on the property of 
the company which is take deemed as trust property. For this 
reason， and because issue of new share means increase of a present 
shareholder's right， itis properly natural for the present share-
holder to have right for subscription for new shares. 
Any action taken by a director which gives pre-emptive right 
for new share to a person who is 'not the shareholder of the 
company is a violation ofduty of as a trustee according to this 
theory. 
Furthermore， we must be attentive to the fact that in such 
cases as explaiIied above， the illegal or unfair actions by the 
director shall be matel'匂1izedonly by breach of prust. This theory 
shows obviously that a shareholder乍 remedialright is unde白l'a 
1imitation of the trust theory. 
C) Amendment of Japanese Company Law 
In the amendmeIlt of Japanese Company Law， we can easi1y 
find many principles adopted trust characters， w hen comparing 
the amended regulation of JapaneseCompany Law to the Anglo-
American legal theory. However， Japanese academic society of 
law is not .going to pay careful attention to this matter. For 
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instance， when adopting the authorized capital system the academic 
s'Ociety interptete this matter as the. amendment aiming at ex-
pediency of procurement of a company's own fund. 
It is not necessary to adopt the authorized capital system if 
its only p世 poseis to aim at the e:l中ediencyof procurement of 
its own ft1nd. If it is for this ptrrpose， payment.in installment of 
share system， by which complete subscription for t，he whole shares 
equivalent to a total amount of capital shall be requested in the 
first step of establishment of a company but as to real payment 
at that time， the company need only one fo町出 ofthe total 
amount of capital and thereafter a shareholders' general meeting 
may decide the adequate date for the payments on the capita1. 
In this case if one considers that authorized capital system 
which leaves procurement of a company's fund. to the wi1 of u 
director is better than the payment in installation for share system， 
due to the fact that it is too complex in taking necessary proceed-
ings for a company to procure its own fund， he abandon legal 
theories of the Contini:mtal Law which place an emphasis on 
character of capital organization of company. 
According to this theory， however， itcannot ful1y enlighten 
substunce of the authorized capital system. 
It is not started for the purposeof. rendering to expedite pro-
curement of the fund by leaving a selection of data and method of 
the procurement its own fund to the wi1 of the directors. B:ut 
leaving the selection to the wi1 of directoTs is based on a theory 
that a director can hold property and management of company 
in trust with shareholders. Therefore， itis nut thoroughly under-
stood if dne deem that the fact of the authorized capita) system has 
been udopted only for the purpose of expediency of procurement 
of u company's fund. 
In the present amendment， the Japanese academic circ1e of 
the la w seems not to understand completely the fact that a position 
of u director is to be same as to that of a trustee. We can五nd
the fol1owing artic1es in the amended company law that “Relation 
between a company and directors shall be. treated in conformity 
with regulations of mandate (Par. 2， A吋. 254， the 01d La w) 
and “A director .sha.l1 have to observe laws and ordinances， a 
memorandum of the association and a :resolutio;n of a sha:reholders' 
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general meeting and shal1 be liable to carry on their duties 
faithfully for the benefit of the company. (2 Art. 254.) Likewise. 
duty of loyalty of五duciaryin五duciaryrelation was described 
clearly in the Japanese amended company law as the most fun-
damental principle. 
However， the Japanese academic circ1e simple e功 lainsthis 
matter as to the regular duty of cxercising reasonable care. because 
the relation between a company and a dir‘ector is a relation of 
mandate. In AngJ.o-American Law，ιhowever， iTustees' duty of 
loyalty in trust relation is entirely di百erentfrom duty of exercising 
reasonable care in relation of bene五ciaries. The former is a theory 
that色duciaryshould act only for the bene'fit of a五duciar'sbenefit 
and shall strictly be prohibited to procure any advantage at the 
expense of a benficiary， but the latter is a theoiy that an executor 
shall be requested tu exercise reasonable care in the conduct of 
his business. 
Therefore， inAnglo-American Law， a: director. namely， a trustee 
shall have to be liable to exercise reasonable care as a good 
executor and at the same time， shal1 have to be under duty to 
serve whole heartedly for the bene五七 of a company and a share. 
holder and to endeavor to hisjher best for the benefit of a company 
and a shareholder， without looking to hisjher own interests. 
Because， the Japanese academic circ1e wants full recognition 
of the particular character of trust relation in AugloベAmerican
Law， itcannot fully understand the newly amended artic1es con-
cerning duty of loyalty of .a directorr. 
And the present amended company law of Japan has formed 
a system of the board of directors. This artic1e in the present 
company la w has also its foundatiOl  in. a legal theory that in case 
where there are several trustess， they are requested to carry on 
business collectively. 
Simi1ar to this case， incase where there are several directors 
they can exercise their authority e妊ectivelyonly when convened 
as the board. 
B江tthe Japanese academic .society doesn't understand this 
theory at al. 
Strengthening of a shareholder's position which is an essential 
part of the amended law has its foundation in equitable right of 
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a shareholder， namely as a beneficiary of the trust; and this fact 
is also not fully understood in Japan. 
As 1 explained before， the amendments of Japanese Company 
Law， such as recognition of a shareholderセrightof representative 
suit to cal日1for a d剖ir閃ecto町r'saccount， (Art. 267， the Present Law) 
con琵rmationof right of obtaining an injunction against director's 
unfair actions (Art. 272， Present Law) and formulation of a share-
holder's right to request to inspect records and documents of a 
company， followed the artic1es on a shareholder's position in 
AngloてAmericanLa w. 
Therefore， the strengthening of a shareholder乍 positionmust 
be. studied synthetically， corresponding to the regulations on the 
authorized capital system and on the duty of lGyalty of a director. 
Japanese acader:nic society sti1 has negative attitude towards 
this representative suit. The main reason seems to lie in the fact 
that such strengthening of a shareholder's position may leave 
enough ground for useless troubles to be put on management of a 
company and may bring interference of thcse who are going 
to usurp the company. 
In representatiVe suit system in Aglo・AmericanLaw. however， 
this Tight is exercised with strict limitations. Only in case w here 
a shareholder tries hisjher best to request a company to take legal 
proceedings against directors or 0缶cersw ho are in charge and 
the shareholder has no other e百ectiveremedv， hejshe may sue at 
a court. 
And， according to legal precedents. in case where there is no 
blamable facts on the part of a company though the company 
took no legal proceedings against the director or in case where 
it is recognized profitable and appropriate for company not to take 
the legal proceedings， the shareholder's request to sue against a 
director at a court shall be rejected. 
On the other hand other legaI precedent shows that in case 
where a shareholder request a company to take legal actions for 
the benifit of other competitive company， supported by the com. 
petitive company and receiveing instructions of the competitive 
company， the shareholde町r乍 requestto take Iegal actions against 
a director is rejected. 
ThU3， ifwe know we have more room for using an idea in 
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equity we have no reason to fear the abusement of the represent-
ative suit system. And an injunction sha11 be issued only in case 
where probable irrecoverable damage bedone and it sha11 not 
forbid any unfair actions made by the director. 
Thinking over these factors， we need not fear an injunction 
as we have guarantee of impossibi1ity of issuing the injunction 
.under the pretext of a trifle flaw. 
As to the exercising of the right to inspect books & records 
of a company in England & America， itis said the right sha11 
not be freely exercised for unjust purpose without limitation. 
And in the amended law or Japan，this effect was c1early 
described. By this artic1e， abusing of this right sha11 be e妊ectively
restrained. 
Thinking over like this， strengthening of a shareholder's posi-
tion sha11 not disturb management of a corppany but sha11 perhaps 
resultrational situation where management of the company. wi1l 
stand on the sound basis of trust relation in which a shareholder 
stands as a bene五ciaryin relation to a director and principle of 
justice and equity is predominant. 
We can easi1y nnd that the amendments are much better than 
the legal theories of the Continental Law where a shareholder's 
right is tread down by' a director's dictatorsh':ip with sharpening 
of the incorporation theory. 
Nevertheless， itis because of misunderstanding of the sub-
stantial legal theory of Anglo-American Company Law that 
scholars of the Japanese academic society of the law fear the 
strengthening of a shareholder's position wi1l result disturbance.of 
management ofa company. 
According to the present amendments， the character of Japanese 
Company Law was completely.changed to the law which has the 
trust character as we11 as the Anglo-American Law. 
But~ the Japanese academic society of the law only classi五ed
these' points of the amendment to three major parts and is not 
going to' enlighten to the fact， synthetical1y speaking， that the 
particular character of these classifications was originated from the 
trust character. As long as they have sUch attitude onamended 
regulations of the company law， in a word of exaggeration， itis 
like waiting for the pig to fly. 
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Under the infiuence of the Continental Law， itis very hard 
for the Japanese scholars to understand fully the Anglo-American 
La w w hich stands antipodal and has an entirely di百erentlegal 
systemcomparing to theContinental Law. 
It is indispensable prerequisite for us to go further in the 
step research of the spirt of the common la将 and equity in 
Englandin in order to understand completely theAnglo-American 
Company Law. 
1 sincerely hope that the Japanese scholars in law wi1 
promptly attain the complete understanding of the AmericanAnglo・
Company Law overcoming this prerequisite and an established 
legal theory which involves full knowledge of trust character on 
the interpretation and application of the amended law wi1 be 
appeared. 
(end) 
